75-82), is so replete with uncommonly good insights that I hesitate to take issue with several points he made. My hesitation stems partly from the desire to be perceived as being in Mr Thompson's corner, notwithstanding my reservations, and partly out of fear that the expression of these reservations will be taken as nothing more than the grumblings of a contemporary philosopher who has been provoked by accusations of being pedantically irrelevant. However, I take heart in the possibility that those who are in the caring professions care enough to suspect that perhaps the moral problems arsing from the complexities of modern medicine are so unsettling that medical practitioners can use all the help they can get: even, perhaps, from the contemporary philosopher. Medical ethics must begin with the doctors Professor Goldworth's argument is itself interesting because it seems to suggest (specifically in his discussion of the distinction between active and passive euthanasia) that philosophers have some special kind of theoretical advice to give doctors and ordinary people. What is this special theoretical knowledge to which philosophers are privy and which seems to be independent of particular situations and contexts ? I would prefer to adopt a more agnostic position, for I do not believe that their skill in conceptual analysis gives philosophers some kind of privileged access to moral truth. The particular skills which philosophers have developed have relevance and significance only when they are applied to the examination of real life problems in the contexts in which they arise. If philosophers want to make a meaningful contribution to medical ethics they must get into medicine, get inside the institutions which shape our values and shape our lives. I am far from thinking that doctors have a monopoly of wisdom in medical morality. In fact, nurses are often more sensitive to the moral dilemmas in medicine, because they are closer to the patients. However, doctors are still, and likely to remain, the ones who take the final decisions, and who have to carry the final responsibility. Practical research in medical ethics must begin then with doctors, patients and nurses, and, if moral theory is to be brought in, it is only when the peculiar issues surrounding this patient in this situation have been clarified. There have obviously been some philosophers who have been prepared to concern themselves seriously with the substantive issues in medical ethics, but the number of British philosophers who have shown any interest in this increasingly important area of social morality is very small. Few moral philosophers concern themselves with the practical problems of decision making and even fewer see their role to be concerned with moral education. Doctors, nurses and other health care professionals are confronted with the need for practical action, often in situations of crisis and stress. Their need is for a more practically orientated moral philosophy rather than for instruction in the niceties of moral theory. Health care professionals may need to be encouraged to be more self critical in their approach to moral questions, more detached perhaps. Philosophers need to be more involved, need the humility perhaps to work alongside their medical colleagues and to share some of their practical dilemmas and often painful responsibilities.
